MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND EFFICIENCY GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION IN NORTH INDIA by A.Banerji et al.
      CDE 






MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND EFFICIENCY: 
GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION IN NORTH INDIA 
 
 





Delhi School of Economics  




Gauri Khanna  
Email: khanna1@hei.unige.ch 
 





Email: j.meenakshi@cgiar.org  
 














Centre for Development Economics 
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics 
 
 1
MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND EFFICIENCY:
GROUNDWATER IRRIGATION IN NORTH INDIA
November 2006
A.Banerji
Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, University of Delhi
 Gauri Khanna
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
J.V. Meenakshi
Delhi School of Economics, and International Food Policy Research Institute,
Washington, D.C.
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the institutions and markets that govern groundwater allocation in the sugarcane
belt of Uttar Pradesh, India, using primary, plot-level data from a village which shares the typical
features of this region. Electricity powers tubewell pumps, and its erratic supply translates into
randomness in irrigation volumes. The paper finds that plots are water-rationed, owing to inadequate
supply of power. A simple model shows that a combination of such rationing and the village-level
mechanism of water sales can lead to great misallocation of water across plots, and result in large
crop losses for plots that irrigate using purchased water. We infer the existence of a social contract
that mitigates these potential losses in the study area to a remarkable extent; in its absence, average
yields are estimated to be 18% lower. The finding that the water allocation is close to efficient (given
the power supply) marks a sharp contrast with much of the existing literature. Notwithstanding the
social contract, the random and inadequate supply of power, and therefore water, is inefficient. The
dysfunctional power supply is part of a larger system of poor incentives to produce reliable and
adequate power. In simulations we find that such reliability can improve yields by up to 10 %, and pay
for a system of electricity pricing that gives incentives to the power supplier to actually provide
adequate power. However, even at reasonably high power prices, irrigation volumes are large enough
to continue to seriously deplete the water table. The problem is that traditional rights of water use do
not take into account the shadow price of the groundwater. We provide a rough first analysis to
suggest that a 15% markup on the economic unit cost of providing electricity would make for
intertemporally efficient water use.
Key Words: Water markets, water tables, water production function, water pricing.
JEL Classification Codes: L1, Q1, Q2.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Amidst rapidly growing economic activity in India, there are increasing concerns of
water scarcity. Eighty five percent of all water use in the country occurs in rural India,
most of it in the form of groundwater irrigation. In North India, the popularity of water
intensive crops (paddy, sugarcane) is said to be responsible for decreasing
groundwater tables. This raises concerns about the overexploitation of groundwater
resources, and the consequent sustainability of agriculture in this region. In this
context, it is important to ensure that the quantum of groundwater that is used for
irrigation yields the maximum possible crop output.
This paper is based on a primary survey conducted in village Tabelagarhi, located in
the sugarcane belt in Western Uttar Pradesh, India, that was collected to address
this concern. We study the institutions that govern water allocation in order to (i) find
out and quantify how well or poorly they perform with respect to water-allocative
efficiency and intensity of water use, (ii) analyze their performance in terms of a
simple stylized model that can explain observed water allocation outcomes, and (iii)
suggest the kinds of changes necessary to improve water use in terms of efficiency
and sustainability.
The broad sugarcane belt has a water economy that shares the institutional features
observed in Tabelagarhi. These include predominant or exclusive use of
groundwater for irrigation, and a low and declining water table that makes it
uneconomical to use diesel to fuel the pumps that run the tubewells. The pumps thus
use electricity to draw water from depths of 70 feet and below. Another common
feature in the region is the erratic and inadequate electricity supply from the State;
this randomness in power supply translates, therefore, to randomness in the supply
of irrigation water. Fragmented landholdings and wide variation in plot sizes imply
that many plots, particularly smaller ones, do not have tubewells. With declining
water tables, submersible pumps are increasingly preferred to non-submersibles, but
these are expensive to install
1; this tends to accentuate the fact that smaller plots go
                                                          
1 The difference in the volume of water per unit time pumped up favors submersibles, and increases with water
depth. Submersible pumps cost upwards of Rs. 150,000.3
without tubewells, even though the region itself has high tubewell density. As a
result, a lot of plots are irrigated using purchased water from informal water markets.
We address the question of allocative efficiency of groundwater by estimating a
sugarcane production function for our surveyed village, Tabelagarhi, using plot-level
data on inputs and sugarcane output. From this, and the observed input levels for
each plot, we estimate the marginal productivity of water (MPW) across plots and
find that this varies significantly, providing evidence of some misallocation of water.
However, a simulation shows that the gains from reallocation are very small if we
redistribute the observed volume of water that each tubewell discharges over the
season to the plots that it services.
2
That water allocation is close to efficient in this static sense is a striking result, and
stands in sharp contrast to much of the literature on South Asia. Many studies have
argued that tubewell owners exercise some monopoly power over water buyers,
leading to inefficient water allocation and inequitable outcomes. However, the extent
of inefficiency has never been quantified; a basic requirement for such quantification
is to measure irrigation volumes, which is not done in most studies. As a
consequence, conclusions about large inefficiencies have sometimes needed an
element of faith.
We also investigate whether inadequate power supply leads to plots being water-
rationed. To do so, we compare the marginal value product of water on a plot with its
water price (if the plot uses purchased water) or the marginal cost of water extraction
(if the plot has a tubewell on it); we find that the marginal value product exceeds the
water price/ marginal cost on almost all plots; on average across all plots, the
marginal value product is 2 ½ times the water price. This is evidence of significant
water rationing.
As indicated earlier, much of the literature on water markets implicitly or explicitly
treats tubewells from which water is sold as water-producing firms, and explains
                                                          
2 Restricting the reallocation from a tubewell to the plots that it services is reasonable in our context
because these plots are located near the tubewell. Transporting water to distant plots over the
existing, unlined water channels would result in large seepage losses.4
inefficiency in terms of their having some monopoly power.
3 It is argued that
monopoly power is higher if there is low tubewell density and if unlined water
channels ‘compel’ farmers to purchase from the nearest tubewell. We find that such
models are not directly applicable either to Tabelagarhi or indeed to the region as a
whole. For one thing, a uniform water price per hour of tubewell use is set in an
informal village-level agreement at the beginning of the season, and is adhered to in
water transactions; so water sellers can only adjust the quantity of water sales.
4
Moreover, the price does not vary across the season in response to varying power
(and therefore water) availability, to clear the market.
5 Most importantly, tubewell
owners who sell water do not choose water sales to maximize profits, in the ordinary
sense of the term.
These features necessitate a departure from the framework typically used in the
literature. Instead, we construct a simple model that captures the institutional
characteristics that govern water transactions in this region.  While details of the
model are set out in subsequent sections, we provide here a brief preview, and the
kinds of questions we are able to analyze using it. In Tabelagarhi as elsewhere in the
region, water sellers are primarily cultivators who sell “surplus water” (i.e. surplus to
the requirements of their own plots). The analysis shows that farmers sell substantial
volumes of water even though the value of the marginal product of water (MPW) on
their own plots is much larger than the water price. In such a situation, maximizing
profits would instead have implied that the tubewell owner uses all the water on his
own plots, until the values of MPW on those equaled the water price; and sell water
only after that point. The observed water allocation implies therefore that water sales
or sharing are driven by social norms or a social contract. Such a social contract is
not necessarily coercive. Owing to fragmented holdings, practically all water sellers
also have plots that buy water from elsewhere. What a water seller loses by selling
                                                          
3 See for example Shah (1993), Meinzen-Dick (1996) and Jacoby, Murgai and Rehman (2004).
4 Volumes of water discharged per unit time vary considerably across tubewells; they are significantly
lower for non-submersibles. So a uniform per hour water price translates into tubewell-specific water
prices per unit volume of water. We calculate these prices using the measured discharge rate of each
tubewell.
5 Note also that even though the tubewells in our study area sell water mostly to nearby plots (to
prevent seepage losses from unlined water channels), there is no evidence of monopoly power in
terms of price-cost margins. he village-level water price per hour is insignificantly different from the
mean average cost of water extraction in the village.5
water at a price lower than its value on his own plot, he can make up by getting
water on those of his plots that are serviced by others’ tubewells.
The modeling of the social contract helps to formalize this argument and highlight its
role in ensuring a close to efficient water allocation. A simulation exercise shows that
yields would be about 18% lower if tubewell owners’ quantities of water sales were
chosen to maximize individual profits in the conventional sense, at the observed
village-level water price.  The model also helps to emphasize that if such a social
contract is in place, inferring about allocative efficiency on the basis of price-cost
margins (as is done frequently) can be very misleading.
The social contract notwithstanding, the erratic and inadequate power nevertheless
extracts a toll; we quantify efficiency gains from power supply reform. Many key
decisions on input applications (including fertilizer applications) for land preparation,
planting, etc. are done in the first few summer months, whereas irrigation takes place
over the entire season/cycle. Therefore, substantive input choices are made in this
region before farmers get to know how the power availability will affect irrigation over
the season, and can be adversely affected by uncertainty of water availability. In
simulations that assume reliable and adequate power and therefore water, we show
that yields go up by more than 9% on average, relative to sample yields. Higher
yields are explained by a combination of increased irrigation volumes in the absence
of power shortages, and increased use of complementary inputs at given irrigation
volumes, by risk-averse farmers, when reliable power supply removes the
uncertainty in irrigation water.
The rationing of water that our analysis finds is not meant to economize on a scarce
resource. Rather, it is a consequence of the pan-Indian problem of poor power
infrastructure, and poor incentives to produce and supply power. Poor incentives are
especially the case in agriculture; in most cases, as in Tabelagarhi, farmers pay a
flat annual charge (based on the horsepower of their pumps) in return for the right to
use as much power as they require. Of course, this gives no incentive to the power6
provider (here, the State Electricity Board (SEB)) to provide adequate power.
6
Remunerative power prices that are based on the quantum of use would presumably
provide enough incentive to a power supplier to supply adequate, reliable power. Our
simulations that presume reliable power supply are done in an alternative setting of
unit-pricing of power. We show that yield gains are sufficient to pay for the higher
cost of power, at reasonable unit prices.
We also study the effect of these alternative scenarios on the all important question
of overall water use.
7 We find that at per-unit power prices that cover the economic
costs of generating it, irrigation volumes are 6% to 12.5% greater than in the sample.
This is understandable, as the profitability of the crop makes it profitable also to
expand water use at the margin. While water use can be reduced in the simulation
by charging higher power prices still, this may not be feasible for a variety of
reasons.
8 Policy must ultimately grapple with the fact that the water used itself has a
shadow price, which the water users may not be taking into account. Farmers have
traditional rights to groundwater beneath their land, and don’t pay to use it. To
properly address issues of intertemporal efficiency and sustainability of water use
requires more data and detailed knowledge of the region’s groundwater hydrology;
nevertheless, we make a first attempt at estimating a markup on the power price that
would make water use intertemporally efficient.
Although this paper is a village study, it has potentially large implications for North
Indian agriculture, because of the common institutional features mentioned above
that prevail over a wide swath of agricultural land. To reiterate, these include the
cultivation of similar water intensive crops, water transport through unlined channels,
informal water markets, and water sharing and pricing norms set at the village level
                                                          
6 There are other systemic problems with the power sector which result not just in poor distribution of
power to agriculture, but to poor power generation more generally, across the country and across
sectors.
7 Efficient allocation of water across space is of course not sufficient for efficiency, as it ignores
allocation over time.  We look at this intertemporal aspect only briefly, in Section V. Our analysis
suggests that there are static and dynamic inefficiencies, including inappropriate crop mix,  owing to
the lack of electricity pricing at the margin. There are also, probably, an inefficiently large number of
tubewells and high pump power owing to limited power supply. This paper, however, takes the
number of tubewells as given.
8 While some of the reasons are political, economic reasons include the fact that higher power prices
that are acceptable on highly fertile soils (as in the villages in the study area) may be less so on land
where yields and farmers’ profits are lower.7
(rather than by individual tubewell owners), as well as similar electricity policies of
states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews some of the
related literature. Section III describes the study area and the data. Section IV
proposes a simple model to understand the water economy of the village, and
outlines the estimation and simulation methods, with technical details relegated to
Appendix B. Section V discusses the estimation and simulation results, ending with a
short discussion of sustainability. Section VI concludes with policy recommendations.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
There is a vast literature studying the problems of groundwater, and on water
markets, in India. We summarize below some select contributions.
9
Among the pioneering contributions to the analysis of groundwater markets in India
is that of Tushaar Shah (1993). In a comprehensive, pan Indian analysis, his is
perhaps the first study to document the various institutional mechanisms through
which water sales are transacted.  These vary from kind transactions, water
contracts interlinked with those for land and/or other inputs, and cash transactions
both on a per acre and per volume basis.  He observes that while such multiplicity of
contract types characterize water markets everywhere, the more ‘developed’ water
markets, such as those found in Northern India,  typically rely on prices that depend
on volume, and lease contracts, which follow standardized formats.  And because of
ubiquitous opportunities to buy water, farmers not owning a water extraction
mechanism are not necessarily disadvantaged. He also points out that the use of
unlined channels to transport water to buyers’ fields results in seepage losses as
high as 30 to 40 percent. This implies that buyers at some distance from the owner’
                                                          
9 Schoengold and Zilberman (2005) is an excellent general reference on the economics of water use
in irrigation.  On India,  Dhawan’s (1995) early work on groundwater irrigation  distinguishes
degradation arising out of mining of water, the case considered here, from that arising out of
increasing salinity.  His was the first nuanced study that explicitly addressed crop- and regional-
specificities in groundwater systems.8
tubewell face effectively a higher price; another (related) implication is that tubewell
owners may act as localized monopolies.
Dubash’s (2002) analysis of water markets in Gujarat also documents the co-
existence of a multiplicity of contracts used for groundwater sales. The type of
contract—whether based on a fixed payment per acre, a price per hour, or a share of
the crop—varies across villages and even across crops. Dubash’s analysis is unique
in at least two respects; first, he effectively captures the dynamic nature of water
contracts, which have changed substantially over time.  For instance, in one village,
he documents a shift away from share payments to fixed payments, largely in
response to enforcement difficulties faced by owners, with buyers cheating on the
size of the total harvest.  Sellers were able to change the terms of the contract
‘unilaterally’ by exercise of social power; for well owners were typically the large
landowners in the village.  This had adverse consequences for the reliability of water
supplies, which the earlier share system helped ensure.  A second significant feature
of this study is the salience given to the institutional basis for water contracts.
Dubash’s analysis highlights the role of social norms in negotiating water contracts;
he suggests, for example, that a ‘moral’ economy operates to prevent sellers from
setting anything substantially more than a commonly perceived ‘fair’ price.
Works that study questions of monopoly power and its attendant inequities, and
natural oligopolies in the context of water sales include Shah (1993), Palmer-Jones
(1994), Meinzen-Dick (2000), Sengupta (2000) and Dubash (2002). Examining the
case of Pakistan, Meinzen-Dick finds that more than half of the water purchasers did
not get their water when requested. Analyzing the determinants of reliable supply,
she finds evidence of better service for older and larger landowners and from diesel
driven tubewells. Since a  switch in technology is expensive (or infeasible) joint
ownership of tubewells for medium-sized farmers may be a solution to reducing the
disparity between water purchasers and sellers. The study reiterates Shah’s finding
that water markets do provide small and poor farmers with an alternative but that the
benefits disproportionately favor tubewell owners who only provide water when they
do not need it themselves.9
Jacoby, Murgai and Rehman (2004) examine the extent of monopoly power
exercised by tubewell owners, and whether they price-discriminate in favour of their
tenants, in Punjab, Pakistan.  The framework of analysis used is based on the theory
of interlinked contracts, which also predicts that owners of tubewells would use more
groundwater relative to those who buy from them.  Their results find evidence of
price discrimination, which is not explained by either spatial characteristics, or any
premium arising out of systematic differences in willingness to pay for ‘reliable’ water
supplies.  They also find that tubewell owners and their tenants use significantly
more groundwater than buyers of groundwater; the combined evidence thus points
to misallocation of groundwater resources in this region as a result of monopoly
power.  A distinctive feature of this paper is that groundwater transactions are
treated in an integrated manner with a parallel ‘informal market’ in canal water that is
commonly observed in their study area.  Canal water is allocated by turns, and the
market operates by the exchange of turns amongst farmers.  The main implication of
such trading in canal water is that overall water use (including both ground and canal
water) may not be allocatively inefficient as indicated by the analysis of groundwater
alone.
Pant (2004) traces the evolution of water markets in eastern and western Uttar
Pradesh. His work is particularly relevant to this study as his observed surge in
investment in privately owned tubewells and in demand for electricity is also
apparent in the surveyed village of Tabelagarhi. The surge is attributable to the
demands placed by the high yielding variety of seeds and the consequent need for
timely and reliable water supply, coupled with farmers’ drive to maximize yield. Pant
concludes that growth increased the demand for power, which while available in
plenty in the 1970s, has now become a constraining factor. Transactions in
groundwater are noted for their importance in elevating the position of the small
farmer by providing access to water. Equally important has been its role in meeting
the challenge posed by scattered land holdings.
A major shortcoming of the literature on groundwater prices in India is that it
generally does not record prices per unit volume of water; obviously a volumetric
measure is necessary for a variety of reasons, including the assessment of the
efficiency of water allocation within and across river basins.  Somanathan and10
Ravindranath (2006) is an exception; their paper estimates marginal values of water
and its elasticity of demand using data on water transactions in the Papagni
watershed in southern India.
III. PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE STUDY VILLAGE
Sugarcane and paddy are the two most water intensive crops widely cultivated in
North India. Our study site is Tabelagarhi village, in Baghpat district, selected from a
'dark' block
10 in the sugarcane belt of Western Uttar Pradesh. This is a freshwater
region with good quality soils. By and large groundwater is the only source of
irrigation for crops grown in this area. The water table in this area has witnessed a
steady decline over the last few decades.
Tabelagarhi has 165 cultivating households. Cultivable land lies to the north, east
and south of the residential neighborhoods. To the west, there is relatively little
cultivation as much of the land there belongs to another village. The largest
proportion of land is in the north, followed by the east.
Sugarcane is cultivated by all households in the village.  It yields more than one
harvest after a sowing; post first harvest, the crop is known as rattoon sugarcane (as
opposed to freshly-sown sugarcane). In this region, the first yield is lower than the
yield of rattoon sugarcane and one crop can last for three seasons.   Most farmers
typically have plots of both crops in the field
11.
Sugarcane sowing takes place in April-May, and harvesting is between February and
April. Rattoon sugarcane, on the other hand, is harvested between late October and
January. Normally, organic manure is applied once, in May; fertilizer is applied at
most twice (May and July), pesticide once. Field activities (which use labor, tractors
and oxen) include preparation of land and sowing in April-May, field maintenance
                                                          
10 Dark blocks are defined as areas where the quantum of groundwater used exceeds 85% of
recharge.
11 Given this, we tracked the two varieties separately throughout the study.  Thus if on a single plot of
land, the farmer had both a rattoon and a new crop, these were categorized as two separate plots,
and information on irrigation details, as of that of other inputs, were recorded separately.11
(such as weeding) in June-July, application of fertilizers etc., preparation and
maintenance of channels for each irrigation, tying of cane in the field in September-
October, and harvesting.
Sugarcane is irrigation intensive, with one irrigation pre-sowing, and regular
irrigations thereafter. Conversations with experts and farmers at the site indicate that
pre-monsoon irrigations are particularly crucial for plant growth. In 2004, the
monsoon was delayed, and there was no rain in June and July. In this situation, it
was a consensus opinion that during this time, one irrigation every 20 days was
desirable. Water from tubewells is transported to plots via largely unlined channels.
So there are seepage losses; but these are restricted by the relative proximity of
other tubewells.
The village, as is the norm in Western Uttar Pradesh, is subject to erratic power
supply. In May, power supply averaged 6-7 hours a day, went up to 8-10 hours in
June, down to 3-5 hours in July (these three months saw no rainfall).  For sugarcane,
timely irrigations early in the season are critical to crop growth; thus the lack of
regular electricity supply meant that in these summer months with no rain, tubewells
seemed to be running flat out whenever there was power. We were told by farmers
that for those who irrigated using purchased water, irrigation plans got delayed due
to poor power supply and priority given to plots owned by tubewell owning farmers.
III.1.  The Data
We first conducted a census of all households and tubewells in the village.  We then
constructed a random sample of  73 tubewells in Tabelagarhi, chosen from  the north
and east of the village (a few also from the south and west) roughly in proportion to
the total numbers of tubewells located in those directions. We then identified all the
plots (326) serviced by these tubewells; these plots belong to about 105 farmers. In
fact, the sample is constructed so that all plots cultivated by these 105 farmers are
included
12. Including all plots serviced by a tubewell implies that we can compute the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
12 Farmers have multiple plots in our data set due to fragmentation of landholdings and division of
cultivable space between freshly sown sugarcane and rattoon sugarcane.12
total amount of water discharged by each tubewell over the season, from plot-level
irrigation data.
Data was collected at three levels: tubewell-specific, plot-specific, and farm
household-specific. Plot-specific data (including details on source of irrigation, date
of each irrigation, terms of the water transaction, information on labour and other
inputs, and soil quality) is needed to estimate the demand for irrigation water.
Tubewell data (including the depth of the tubewell, capacity of the motor, tubewell
discharge, maintenance costs and history) helps to estimate water supply
characteristics; for example, the cost of water extraction is lower for submersibles
than for non-submersibles. Farm household data (including information on
household members, and their education levels, and farm assets) can potentially
help to identify farmer-specific effects on production. The field work was conducted
once every two to three weeks, over the entire sugarcane cycle (April, 2004 to April,
2005). This frequency corresponded to the pattern of irrigations and large number of
plots to be tracked, and helped in keeping the recall period low. We have also
experimented with leaving booklets with educated farmers, to be filled in by them on
a regular basis. More details on the variables collected are relegated to Appendix A.
III.2. Irrigation and water transactions in Tabelagarhi
The institutions by which water transactions are governed form a natural way of
categorizing the plots in our sample. Of the 73 tubewells in our sample, 47 are under
single, and 26 under joint ownership. Joint ownership is usually a consequence of
inheritance by multiple sons. As indicated in Table 1.1, the average number of plots
irrigated by single-owner tubewells is smaller than that irrigated by jointly-owned
tubewells.  However, as noted later, the unit area for plots irrigated by singly-owned
tubewells is much larger (so that the total area irrigated is comparable).
The type of ownership has significant implications for the availability of surplus water
for sale. For instance, sale of water is far more likely in single-owner than in joint-
owner tubewells. Similarly, the average number of plots to which water sales
occurred was much higher for singly-owned than for jointly-owned tubewells.13
29 of the tubewells are 'submersible' and the rest are 'non-submersible'. All tubewells
run on electricity. Submersible tubewells are much more expensive to purchase. For
areas with low water tables, they are however the desired technology to possess. As
shown in Table 1.2, on average for our sample, a submersible takes approximately
90 minutes to irrigate one bigha (1/5 acre), whereas a non-submersible takes about
2 hours. The costs of operating tubewells include the cost of electricity and
maintenance costs. Electricity cost is an annual charge, based on the horsepower of
the pump (Rupees 70 per month per horsepower). Submersibles not only have
higher discharges, but are less prone to break-downs. The average number of times
in the previous 12 months that repairs were effected to submersible tubewells was
1.5, half that for non-submersibles.  Correspondingly, maintenance costs for
submersibles were also lower.
It is also useful to examine the pattern of irrigation, disaggregated by category of
plot, with category I referring to plots served by singly-owned tubewells, II referring to
plots served by jointly-owned tubewells, while category III plots rely on purchased
water (Table 1.3.). 117 plots in the sample source water from tubewells singly owned
by the cultivators of these plots (category I); 122 source water from jointly owned
tubewells (category II); 87 plots are being irrigated using purchased water (category
III). The average plot size in the three categories is, respectively, 11.7, 5.7 and 4.7
bighas
13. About half of the plots are under fresh sugarcane, and the rest under
rattoon sugarcane.
The number of irrigations overall, favors category I plots that are watered through an
owned tubewell; the least number of irrigations are given to plots which rely on
purchased water (category III). More than the number of irrigations, their timing is
crucial for plant growth. A key indication that plots that purchased water could not
time their irrigations as well as others is the fact that in the dry summer months, a
much lower percentage of these plots managed the recommended 4-5 irrigations.
The average depth of each irrigation is also somewhat lower for these Category III
plots.
                                                          
13 One bigha equals one-fifth of an acre, in this region.14
Prices of water are quoted on a per hour basis. At the beginning of the season, a
social consensus emerges and a water price is set in rupees per hour of use of a
tubewell (Rs.15/hour in the data set). By and large, this is the price charged across
the entire village, and buyers and sellers are price takers. This price is a slight
markup on an average, per hour cost of operating a tubewell in the village. This
apparent uniformity of prices has been noted elsewhere, and is cited as evidence
that prices are determined as an outcome of a social contract.
14 Yet, when the
variation among tubewells in term of the volume discharged per hour is taken into
account, it is clear that prices are anything but uniform.
We calculate the price of water per unit volume charged by a tubewell by dividing Rs.
15 by the measured volume of water that the tubewell discharges per hour. Thus the
average price per bigha-inch (about 20,500 litres) of water across all tubewells is
Rs.6.50
15. There is substantial variation around this mean, with the 25
th and 75
th
percentiles being Rs. 4.70 and 8 respectively. Submersible pumps (about 40% of the
pump sets) discharge much more water than non-submersibles, so the volumetric
prices of water from tubewells with submersibles is significantly lower.  Pump sets of
different vintages also show variation.
III.3. Yields, soil quality and other inputs
As noted earlier, a distinguishing characteristic of the sugarcane crop is the practice
of rattooning. Yields in the study area are higher for the rattoon than a fresh-sown
crop, and begin to taper off after the first rattoon. Thus a fresh planting is
necessitated every 2-3 seasons.
Further, there are two major varieties of sugarcane cultivated in this village:  known
as the ‘early variety’ and ‘general variety.’  We outline in Appendix B.3 the method
                                                          
14 See for example Dubash (2002).
15 By way of comparison, this is a little greater than half of the average water price that Somanathan
and Ravindranath (2006) estimate for water transactions in the Papagni watershed in the southern
states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.15
used to aggregate across these varieties; the yields and input use for the two are
quite similar.
In the study area, rattoon yields (at 68 quintals per bigha) are substantially higher
than yields for the new crop (at 48 quintals per bigha).  Table 1.4 summarizes yields
of rattoon and non-rattoon sugarcane by category of plot, to examine whether the
skewed pattern of irrigation volume and timing is reflected in differential yields.
As one might expect given the summary statistics on irrigation, yields are lower on
plots with purchased water (both overall and when disaggregated by rattoon vs
fresh-sown crops), but the  differences, particularly for fresh-sown yields, are not
substantial.
These differences in yields are, of course, mediated not just by the amount of
irrigation, but by soil quality and other inputs as well.  As noted earlier, soil samples
were collected from each of the plots in the sample
16 and sent to the National Bureau
of Soil Surveys and Land Use Planning for analysis.  The soils in these areas are of
good quality; about two-thirds of the plots in Tabelagarhi may be classified as “sandy
loam”, and another 22% as loam.  Loamy soils are better, as they contain sand and
silt in proportionate amounts, and are well drained.  In contrast sandy loam soils are
worse, in that these are coarse-textured, and typically require more irrigations. The
remaining 10% of the plots are classified as clay loam, loamy sand, and silt loam.
In terms of productivity, however, the impact of soil quality is discernible, if at all, only
for category III plots, where yields on loam soils are 6 quintal per bigha higher than
on sandy loam soils (Table 1.5).
Summary statistics for the other major inputs are presented in Table 2.  With labor,
all activities are summed across by type of activity (land preparation and sowing,
weeding and digging, applications of irrigation and other inputs, tying of cane,
harvesting) and by type of labor (hired casual labor and permanent labor, contractual
                                                          
16 Samples were collected from three different corners of each plot and mixed together. These were
then further subdivided into four parts of which two parts were kept, mixed and then finally put in a
bag.16
labor, household labor, labor in exchange and other miscellaneous forms).
Aggregate labor use by category of plot suggests that plots which purchase water
are slightly more labor intensive.
Tractors are primarily used at the time of pre-sowing for land preparation, and for
sowing. Oxen are also used for these activities; in addition, they are used for
weeding and digging and for transporting sugarcane to sugar depots at harvest time.
While oxen were used on almost all plots, tractors were used on about half of them.
Tractors tend to be used on the larger-sized plots, so that their use is more on
average on Category I plots than on others.
IV. MODELS AND METHODS
IV.1. A Model of Water Allocation in the Village
Before analyzing issues of water rationing and efficient water allocation, it is useful to
have a stylized model of water allocation in the village. We describe here simplified
versions of the two main kinds of institutions we observe: water sales from single-
owner tubewells, and water sharing from jointly owned tubewells.
IV.1.1. Water Sales from Single Owner Tubewells
At the beginning of the season, there is an agreement between the owner of a
tubewell and prospective buyers, to supply water to the buyers’ plots for the entire
season. Suppose farmer s cultivates plot s, using water from his own tubewell t
located on the plot. To keep the notation simple, let there be only one buyer of water
from this tubewell
17: so, suppose farmer s agrees to sell water, to a single plot i,
cultivated by farmer i. The price of water that enters the agreement respects a
centrally set per hour price. It is therefore determined as follows. A per hour price for
using a tubewell and pump is set in a village-level agreement at the beginning of the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
17 In the data set, the average number of buyers from single owner tubewells is 1.7.17
season
18. The price of water per unit volume from tubewell t is calculated as this per
hour price divided by the discharge (volume of water discharged per hour) of
tubewell t
19. The per hour price is set by the village as a rough markup on average
cost of maintaining pumps and tubewells and payment for electricity. In our model,
we simply take as given the village level per hour water price (and the implied water
prices for each tubewell), explaining later why this price setting process may make
sense.
Many of the input decisions for plots are made early in the season, when the extent
of power availability through the season, and therefore water availability
20, is not
known. To model this, let the amount of water available from tubewell t be a random
variable  t W . We make the following, mostly simplifying, assumptions about  t W .
t W is distributed on an interval  ] , 0 [ t w , according to a continuously differentiable
distribution function G (whose derivative is g).  t w is greater than the optimal irrigation
volume choices that farmers s and i would make if there were no water constraint.
Farmers s and i respectively make input choices  } 1 ,..., 3 { ), ( ), ( − ∈ k j x x ij sj  before it
is known how much water t w will actually be available from the tubewell (i.e., before
the realization of  t W is known). (j=1,2, correspond to variables used in the estimation
that are not explicitly required here: j=2 corresponds to a plot size variable, which is
given, as we do not study acreage allocation decisions; j=1 corresponds to the
constant term in the production function estimation; k refers to the irrigation variable)
assume that farmers are risk-averse, maximizing the utility of profits with a twice
continuously differentiable utility function u
21, satisfying  0 ' ' , 0 ' < > u u . Assume for
simplicity that the farmers have no alternative water source.
                                                          
18For the season in question, this was Rs. 15 per hour.
19 Since different tubewells have different discharge rates, this results in different volumetric prices for
water from different tubewells, even though the centrally agreed water price per hour was Rupees 15.
The big source of discharge variation is type of tubewell, with discharges from submersible pumps
being much larger than for their non-submersible counterparts.
20 All tubewell pumps in the village run on electricity
21 assumed for simplicity to be the same for all farmers18
Suppose the input choices  } 1 ,..., 3 { ), ( ), ( − ∈ k j x x ij sj  have been made, and then the
uncertainty on water is resolved, with  t w being the amount available from tubewell t.
First, we analyze the allocation of this water if farmer s wishes to maximize profits
22.
Assumption 1. Farmer s’s water sales maximize profits
Let p be the sugarcane output price,  ) , ), (( β sk sj x x f  be the production function (β  is
a parameter vector), and  ik q be the price per unit of water paid by farmer i (the
notation q is used for input price or input price vector). As mentioned before, this
price is derived from a centrally set water price per hour of tubewell use, and is
higher than  t c , the constant marginal cost of extracting water from tubewell t
23.
Farmer s can therefore only decide the amount of water to sell. We assume that f is
twice continuously differentiable, and that for every input  } ,..., 2 { k j∈ , the first and
second partial derivatives satisfy respectively 0 , 0 , 0 > < > ij jj j f f f . We also
assume that at positive input prices, a unique, interior profit maximum exists that is
characterized by the usual first-order conditions.
Let  *
sk x and  *
ik x respectively solve
24
ik sk sj k q x x pf = ) , ), (( * β (1)
ik ik ij k q x x pf = ) , ), (( * β (2)
Let  sk x  solve
t sk sj k c x x pf = ) , ), (( β (3)
                                                          
22 Post the resolution of water uncertainty, maximizing profits or the utility of profits yields the same
optimum.
23 The price per bigha-inch of water from tubewell t is simply the village level price of water per hour
divided by the discharge from the tubewell (in bigha-inches per hour).
24 Eqs.(1) and (2) refer to irrigation volumes such that the values of MPW on plots s and i equal the
price per unit volume of water from tubewell t. Eq (3), to the irrigation volume at which the value of the
MPW on plot s equals the marginal cost of water extraction from tubewell t.19
Proposition 1.  Suppose farmers s and i have chosen input vectors
} 1 ,..., 3 { ), ( ), ( − ∈ k j x x ij sj .
Suppose a volume  t w of water becomes available and farmer s maximizes profits.
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The proof is relegated to Appendix B.1. Since water sales fetch farmer s a revenue
of Rupees ik q per unit, he will use all available water on his plot, and sell none, as
long as the value of the marginal product of water (MPW) on his plot exceeds  ik q .
For larger quantities of water, he will use water on his own plot to the point that its
value of MPW equals the water price, and sell the rest to farmer i. He will do so until
farmer i’s demand is sated, and use additional amounts on his own plot again, until
the value of MPW there decreases to equal the marginal cost of extraction. We
discuss briefly the implications of the proposition for this paper. Of course, this
allocation of water is not efficient. Once the vectors of other inputs are chosen for the
two plots, efficiency of water allocation requires that its marginal product on the two
plots be equal:
) , ), (( ) , ), (( β β ik ij k sk sj k x x f x x f = (5)
The allocation in Proposition 1 almost nowhere satisfies Eq.(5). Note also that if
water rationing is not a problem, then Proposition 1 implies that farmer s’s water
volume will satisfy Eq.(3) while farmer i’s will satisfy Eq.(2). In that case, inefficiency
results because the water price for farmer i is higher than the unit cost of water
extraction. But from the point of view of the data, the allocation in the absence of
water rationing is not that relevant. For the data show most often the case that the
irrigation volumes on such plots as s and i are such that the values of MPW on both
the water seller and water buyer plots significantly exceed  ik q . This is evidence of
water rationing, specifically, that  * *
ik sk t x x w + < . Moreover, from Proposition 1, this20
should imply that the water buying plot gets no water. Yet, unlike Proposition 1,
water buyers do get to purchase appreciable quantities of water in the data. As
discussed in Section V, we are led to the conclusion that there is both water
rationing,  and that water selling cultivators do not maximize profits in the sense
assumed to arrive at Proposition 1. Note also that the observed allocation from the
data implies that the MPW on the tubewell owners’ and water buyers’ plots are
closer to each other than would be the case under the Proposition 1 allocation. This
reduces crop yield losses, relative to the outcome in Proposition 1. The water
allocation we observe in the village is therefore better understood in terms of the
assumption below, an alternative to Assumption 1.
Assumption 1A. Water Allocation is governed by a Social Contract
The reason that there is inefficiency in the presence of water rationing is that farmers
transacting in water do not or cannot make any transfers save the fixed water price.
Given that this is so, the observed allocation, and anecdotal evidence, suggests that
a  social contract operates to check crop yield losses. We model this simply by
assuming that the farmers are governed by the following kind of water sharing
arrangement:
When the available water  * *
ik sk t x x w + < , farmers s and i divide it in some positive
proportions  ) ( ), ( t it t st w w φ φ  according to either a prior mutual agreement, or an
agreement governed centrally by the village (with farmer i paying the unit price  ik q ).
When   * *
ik sk t x x w + ≥ , given the price  ik q of water, the allocation is as given in
Proposition 1.
Assume for simplicity that the functions  ) ( ), ( t it t st w w φ φ  are continuous, and that
) , ( )) ( ), ( ( lim * *
) ( * * ik sk t it t st x x w x x w w
ik sk t
=
+ ↑ φ φ . This property makes the allocation
efficient if  * *
ik sk t x x w + = , a reasonable assumption in trying to model a social
arrangement that attempts to restrain the extent of water misallocation.21
Such a social contract is not necessarily coercive. Most farmers in the village have
multiple plots. The plots of a farmer are typically disparate in size, and owing to
fragmentation of land, not all contiguous. As a result, it is almost never the case that
all of a farmer’s plots have tubewells. Therefore, a farmer that sells water from a
tubewell on some plot, generally also buys water for some other plot. In a scenario
with water rationing, the social contract cuts into the farmer’s profits as a water
seller, on account of unprofitable water sales. However, it also adds to his profits on
plots where he buys water, by providing water where none would be available if
water sellers maximized profits from water sales. Data analysis in Section V will
show that the latter effect is much larger. Although  we do not model how the
functions  it st φ φ , , or the village-level water price per hour are determined (simply
taking them as given), it is easy to see how  this kind of social contract can be an
equilibrium outcome, for example, of a village-wide bargain, or a repeated game, or
an evolved social norm.
We now describe the choice of all inputs (including water, taking acreage as given)
under a social contract. Let  1 ,..., 3 , − = k j q j  be the prices of inputs other than water.
These are assumed to be the same across farmers, for simplicity. Let
25
} , min{ ) ( *
ik t sk t
h
sk x w x w x − = (6)
Farmer s’s problem before the amount of water available is known is to choose an
input vector  1
3 ) ( −
=
k
j sj x  in order to maximize
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25 Eq.(6) gives the amount of water that plot s would use, if the total water available is more than what
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After a couple of cancellations, we may write
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to be farmer s’s random allocation of irrigation water. Then, the first-order condition
for an interior maximum equates Eq.(8) to 0, and may be written as
[ ] 0 ) ) , ), (( )( ( ' = − j sk sj j sk X q X x pf X u E
sk β                  (10)
where we have suppressed all arguments of marginal utility  ' u  other than  sk X . Note
that Eq.(10) implies
0 ))] ( ' ( / ) ) , ), (( ), ( ' ( [ ] ) , ), (( [ > − − = − sk j sk sj j sk j sk sj j X u E q X x pf X u Cov q X x pf E β β           (10’)
The inequality above obtains due to risk aversion:  ' u  is decreasing in  sk X  (whereas
the marginal product  j f  is increasing in it). We will assume for simplicity that the
first-order conditions characterize farmers’ optimal choices, and have a unique23
solution. Eq.(10’) implies that at the optimal choice of inputs j=3,...,k-1, the relevant
marginal value products are greater than the corresponding input prices.
Farmer i chooses  k j ij x ≠ ) ( to maximize
[] + − − + − = ∑
≠
) ) , ), (( ( ))). ( ( 1 ( ) ( * * * *
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we have in similar fashion farmer i’s first-order conditions for an interior maximum:
[ ] 0 ) ) , ), (( )( ( ' = − j ik ij j ik X q X x pf X u E
ik β           (13)
so that
0 ))] ( ' ( / ) ) , ), (( ), ( ' ( [( ] ) , ), (( [ > − − = − ik j ik ij j ik j ik ij j X u E q X x pf X u Cov q X x pf E β β      (13)’
Note that the optimal choice of the inputs ) ( sj x , (and therefore of *
sk x ), depends on
*
ik x , which is a parameter in farmer s’s optimization problem. Similarly, the optimal
choice of ) ( ij x , (and therefore  *
ik x ), depends on  *
sk x . So we will define an equilibrium
allocation as an allocation of inputs (including random water allocation to the two
plots) that is mutually consistent.24
Definition 1. An equilibrium allocation is a tuple  ) , ) ( , , ) (( ik k j ij sk k j sj X x X x ≠ ≠ such
that
 (i)  ) ( sj x is a solution to Eq. (10);  ) ( ij x is a solution to Eq.(13); the parameters
* * , ik sk x x in, respectively, farmer i’s and farmer s’s optimization problems are solutions
to Eq.(1) and Eq.(2) respectively.
(ii) The random water allocation specified by the social contract uses  *
sk x and
*
ik x specified in (i) above:  sk X is given by Eq.(9),  ik X is given by Eq.(12).
Proposition 2 asserts the existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 2. An equilibrium allocation exists.
The proof of this proposition is in Appendix B.1. Let us summarize the contrasting
implications (for the data) of water allocations governed by profit maximization from
water sales (Assumption 1, leading to Proposition 1) as opposed to a social contract
(Assumption 1A, and Proposition 2). Suppose we evaluate values of MPW for
different single tubewell owner and water buyer plots, using the observed choices of
inputs (including water). Comparing them to water prices from these tubewells, we
find that the values of the MPW for both kinds of plots exceed the water prices. Since
water selling plots have marginal product values above the water sale price, under
Assumption 1 of static profit maximization this should imply that water buying plots
are not getting any water. If this is not so, a social contract assumption like
Assumption 1A, and the water allocation therein explain the data better
26.
IV.1.2. Water Sharing from Jointly Owned Tubewells
Joint ownership of a tubewell occurs between brothers, due to inheritance. The joint
owners share water from the tubewell, and the costs of maintenance. But they are
                                                          
26 There are no implications for similar marginal product – input price comparisons for other inputs.
For those, Eq.(13) and (16) show that comparisons work only in an expected sense. They are not
meaningful with the particular realization of the water consumption random variables in the data.25
separate cultivators. Usually, the largest stakeholder in the tubewell is the first to
receive water in an irrigation cycle, followed by other partners in decreasing
importance of their investment share. In a setting of limited power availability,
arranging for efficient water sharing requires that farmers agree to use less water
than the amounts that equate the marginal value products of water on their plots with
the marginal cost of water extraction. How close the allocation is to efficient is an
empirical question that can be answered using the MPW estimates and Simulation 1
(Section V).
IV.2. Estimating the Production Function
The first part of our empirical exercise is to estimate a sugarcane production function
for the village. A practical problem with estimating a production function at the village
level is lack of variation in the explanatory variables across plots. If the input prices
faced by different farmers in the same village are the same, their input choices are
very similar. As discussed above, we do not face this problem since there is
appreciable variation in water prices across plots; there is also some variation in soil
quality, and a little variation in rental charges for tractors and oxen. Thus relative
prices of inputs vary across plots, and price-taking profit maximizing farmers are
expected to vary their input demands accordingly.
Using data on plot level inputs and outputs, consider estimating a production function
by taking logs in Eq.(14) below:
i i i x f y ε β ) , ( =           (14)
Here,  i i i x y ε , , are, respectively, output, a k-dimensional input vector (of which the
kth input is
water), and error on plot i, and β is a k-dimensional parameter vector.
A major difficulty with estimating Eq.(14) (or indeed with estimating cost or profit
functions) is a well-known identification problem (Marschak and Andrews(1944). If
there are variables that the farmer, but not the econometrician, observes, then profit
maximizing farmers’ input choices are correlated with the error term in the26
regression, and the estimates are biased. In the context of agriculture, such
unobserved variables could include soil quality, farm management practices, plant
health characteristics. This is a long-recognized problem, to which various solutions
have been offered. (See for example Griliches and Mairesse (1998), Olley and
Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin(2003)). Often, instruments (mostly, input prices)
are used to get around the endogeneity problem; several recent papers use panel
data methods. In the present paper, input prices except water price are not too
different across plots, and cannot be used as instruments. We do not have panel
data. So we have attempted to exploit two different kinds of information that we
collected. First, we have plot-level data on soil quality, the amount of family labor
used, and several other such variables which are arguably exogenous and can be
used as instruments. Moreover, we exploit the fact that most farmers in the data set
cultivate multiple plots; thus plant health characteristics and other farmer-specific
characteristics are sought to be captured by farmer-specific dummies. We therefore
estimate the equation
  i t i i a x f y ε β ) , ( =           (15)
where  t a is a farmer t-specific shock unobserved by the econometrician (where
farmer t
cultivates plot i), which we can estimate using a dummy for farmer t
27.
In our econometric work, we have experimented with several functional forms and
find that the simple Cobb-Douglas production function works best. For example, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that coefficients of all the interactive and nonlinear
terms of the Translog function (which nests the Cobb-Douglas as its linear part) are
jointly insignificant
28. A larger study, encompassing many villages, would presumably
have enough variability to better address the question of appropriate functional form;
                                                          
27 We find that including farmer fixed effects gives reasonable results; our instruments are not good
enough to improve on these. For example water prices are too weakly correlated with irrigation
volumes. This is as expected in the presence of water rationing and a social contract dictating water
allocation.
28 The F(1,281)-statistic corresponding to the null that the higher order terms of the Translog are all
zero evaluates to 0.82. Since the probability exceeding this value is 0.365, we cannot reject the null.27
the present paper uses the Cobb-Douglas as a good first approximation
29. Our











) ln( ) ln(           (16)
where i indexes plots, t indexes farmers,  1 1 = i x , for all i,   1 = t d if plot i is cultivated
by farmer t, and is zero otherwise;  c d equals 1 if plot i has a rattoon crop, and is zero
if the crop is fresh sown sugarcane. The explanatory variables  ij x  are plot size,
manure, fertilizer value, labor, tractor and oxen hours, and irrigation volume.
IV.3. Assessing Allocative Efficiency
We use the estimated production function to assess efficiency of water allocation as
follows. In multiplicative form, the fitted value of Cobb-Douglas output on plot i,
evaluates to
  k c t t
ik i
d d
i x x e x f
β β λ γ β β
ˆ ˆ
2
) ˆ ˆ ˆ ( ... ) ˆ , ( 2 1 ∑ =
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 (where  k f  is the partial derivative of f with respect to  k x  (the volume of water)).
Allocative efficiency requires that this marginal product be the same on every plot.
We first assess whether these marginal product numbers vary significantly across
plots.
Next, we conduct an examination of whether there is water rationing. Following the
discussion of the model in Section IV.2, in the absence of a water constraint, we
should observe the following. For plots buying water, profit maximization implies that
                                                          
29 The specific discomfort with the Cobb-Douglas functional form is that it restricts the elasticity of
substitution between inputs in a drastic fashion, and also imposes symmetry in this across all pairs of
inputs.28
the value of the MPW should equal the unit price of water. For plots with owned
tubewells, the value of the MPW should equal the marginal cost of water extraction
from that tubewell. On the other hand, values of MPW significantly larger than water
prices/costs imply that water is rationed. So we first check whether the (value of) the
marginal product of water (Eq.(17)) on plot i is significantly different from the price
ik q (or marginal cost) of water for the plot. We do this by constructing a 95%
confidence band  ) , ( i i b a around Eq.(17), constructed using asymptotic theory. The
details of the construction are in Appendix B. If  ) , ( i i ik b a q ∈ , then the marginal
product of water is not significantly different from the water price; in this case, the
source of allocative inefficiency is the differences in water prices / costs of water
extraction across plots. On the other hand, if  i ik a q < , then plot i is rationed for
water.
We find there is substantial water rationing, and that the water allocation indicates
the existence of a social contract akin to Assumption 1A, rather than tubewell owners
choosing water sales amounts to maximize profits.
A note on estimating the marginal cost of water extraction from a tubewell. The
marginal cost of water extraction does not include a charge for electricity, since
those are lump sum annual charges. But it can depend on the number of pump
breakdowns (and the cost of repair), if the number of hours of operation is positively
related to the number of breakdowns. We model the number of breakdowns as a
Poisson process, estimate the Poisson parameter from data on hours of operation
and number of breakdowns for each pump. From this we can estimate a marginal
cost of water extraction for each tubewell. See Appendix B.3 for details.
IV.4. The Impact of Allocative Inefficiency and Policy Alternatives
IV.4.1. Simulation 1: Losses from Inefficient Water Allocation
First, we examine the extent of profit and crop output losses owing to inefficient
water allocation in the data. The specific question is: What would the outputs from29
the sample plots be if the total observed water from each tubewell in the sample is
allocated efficiently across the plots that are serviced by that tubewell?
Suppose for every plot i in the data set, the choice  ) ( ij x of inputs other than irrigation
has been made as in the data. Suppose the constant marginal cost of water
extraction from tubewell t is  t c , and let U(t) be the set of all plots in the sample that
are serviced by tubewell t. Let  t w be the total volume of water discharged from
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t ik w x , and for all  0 ˆ ), ( ≥ ∈ ik x t U i .           (18)
We solve this problem, evaluated at the estimated parameter vector β ˆ , for each
tubewell in the data set. Then we compare the total simulated output with the total
output in the sample.
In the above simulation, as well as in all others, we make the simplifying assumption
that the mapping from tubewells to user plots stays the same. Given that water is
transported through unlined water channels, this mapping is largely determined by
proximity of plots to particular tubewells. This paper does not address questions of
changes in water transport technology (such as a system of pipes); therefore, it is
reasonable to retain the tubewell-user plot mapping as it is.
IV.4.2. Simulation 2: The Value of the Social Contract
As discussed earlier, the data indicate that even though tubewell owners’ plots are
short of water (with marginal value products of water exceeding the water price),
they sell substantial amounts of water to other plots at those water prices. The
degree of social cooperation required to do this is present perhaps due to the30
relatively homogeneous social and economic composition
30 of the village. In the
absence of this, one would expect outcomes closer to the allocation described in
Proposition 1. Simulation 2 therefore answers the following question: What would be
the impact on yields if tubewell owners maximize profits and allocate water according
to Proposition 1?
We implement this simulation for each tubewell in the sample. We work out the total
volume of water that each tubewell t discharged, and allocate it according to
Proposition 1. As a practical matter, we find that for each tubewell, the total volume
of water in the sample is either so insufficient that this allocation leaves some water
buying plots with no water at all, or moderately insufficient, so that they get water left
over after the MPWs on the owner’s plots are equalized with the water price of the
tubewell.
IV.4.3. Simulation 3: (Alternative Policy Simulations) Implications of reliable
power supply and unit pricing
A common feature of the sugarcane belt is the low marginal cost of extracting water,
owing to the absence of groundwater pricing and a zero marginal cost of electricity
use. By itself, this would encourage overuse of water. The observed absence of
overuse is explained by the stringently constrained and erratic power supply. As poor
power supply is said to adversely affect plant growth, we simulate yields in the
presence of reliable supply of power.
However, the lump sum charges for electricity leaves the power supplier no incentive
to provide reliable power. Therefore, this simulation examines the potential impact of
two major policy instruments that can be used: metered, unit pricing of electricity to
provide incentives to the power provider, and reliable power supply to relax water
rationing. With unit pricing at remunerative levels, the power supplier has an
incentive to supply power. The results in the next section show that there is a wide
gap between the values of the marginal product of water on plots and the marginal
                                                          
30 Most farmers belong to the same caste, all farmers grow sugar cane, have fragmented holdings
and depend on groundwater for irrigation.31
cost of water extraction. This suggests that farmers could be willing to pay
substantial unit prices for electricity while increasing profits as well, provided power
is reliably supplied. However, if it is profitable to use water at a certain unit power
price, the estimation results also suggest that farmers will use more water than they
could in the water rationed context observed in the data. So, the simulation tracks
the effect of different unit prices of power, and reliable power supply, on yields,
profits, water use, and power revenue to the power provider.
Modeling Simulation 3
Consider the ramifications of reliable power supply and unit pricing on water
allocation in our context. Suppose the power provider sets a unit price of  e c , and for
convenience suppose there is no lump sum charge for power use. For each
tubewell, the unit electricity price translates to a unit cost of water extraction. This
cost varies across tubewells as their discharges and vintages (hence repair costs)
vary. At the village level, a central per hour price of tubewell use is set, based on the
unit costs of water extraction, at which for each tubewell, it is profitable to supply
water.
Now consider the problem of a farmer of plot s, that has tubewell t, and suppose that
B(t) is the set of plots that buy water from this tubewell. With reliable power supply,
the high density of tubewells implies there is no water constraint, i.e. 
* *
ik sk t x x w + ≥ . In
the absence of water uncertainty, risk-averse farmers in effect maximize profits.
Suppose that farmer s’s optimal input choices are ) ˆ ), ˆ (( sk sj x x , and those for the water
buyers are  ) ( ) ˆ ), ˆ (( t B i ik ij x x ∈ . If the water price  ik q per bigha-inch is greater than the
unit cost of extraction  t c from the tubewell, farmer s would supply the entire demand
for water from the plots B(t). So, for him,
] ) , ), (( max[ arg ) ˆ ), ˆ (( sk t
j
sj j sk sj sk sj x c x q x x pf x x − − ∈ ∑ β           (20)
And for all plots  ) (t B i∈ ,32
] ) , ), (( max[ arg ) ˆ ), ˆ (( ik ik
j
ij j ik ij ik ij x q x q x x pf x x − − ∈ ∑ β           (21)
That is, the optimization problems of the different plots can be solved separately,
because there is no common water constraint. Similar reasoning applies to plots that
share water, or buy water from, jointly owned tubewells. From the solutions to plot
level optimization problems, we derive per bigha averages for ouput, profit, irrigation
volume, and power revenue, and compare them with the baseline numbers observed
in the data.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
V.1. Evidence on rationing
Table 3 presents the Cobb-Douglas production function estimates. All variables
except fertilizers have the right sign and all but manure are significant. The largest of
the elasticities are for plot size (0.742), oxen (0.1254), tractor (0.0905), labor
(0.0762), and irrigation (0.0643). Fertilizers and manure have insignificant
coefficients. As evidenced by the crop dummy, rattoon sugarcane in this region gives
somewhat higher output than fresh sown sugarcane. Eight farmer dummies are
significant and sizeable (absolute values between 0.2 and 0.4).
31
Using these estimates, we follow Appendix B.2 to derive estimates of the marginal
product of water (MPW) for each plot, and a 95% confidence interval around each of
them.  See Table 4. For the sample overall, the average value of MPW (the MPW
times the sugarcane price of Rs. 102 per quintal) is about Rupees 16.6 per additional
bigha-inch of water (1 bigha-inch of water equals about 20,558 litres). The 95%
confidence intervals vary from about Rupees  3 . 0 ± to 4 . 0 ± . The mean marginal value
                                                          
31 We also experimented with alternative specifications; for example, a dummy for whether the plot is
a purchaser of water. This turns out to be insignificant, and does not greatly affect the other estimated
coefficients. This suggests that the estimates of MPWs are fairly robust.33
product is about 2.5 times greater than the mean water price of Rs. 6.53 per bigha-
inch. A closer investigation bears out the suggestion of widespread water rationing:
the value of MPW is significantly larger than the water price for 308 of the 326 plots.
Since this is the case, a tubewell owner seeking to maximize profits on a plot of his
own should choose irrigation volumes such that the value of the MPW on this plot
equals or drops below the water price he charges for selling water; and sell water
only after meeting this water requirement (as in Proposition 1 in Section IV). Instead,
the data show that plots which buy water get appreciable amounts, given the
rationing. So, a social contract operates to distribute water more equitably than profit
maximization by water sellers would permit.
Plots with own tubewells are relatively less water-rationed. Table 4B shows that the
mean marginal value product of water for plots with own tubewell is Rupees 11.87,
that for plots irrigated from a jointly-owned tubewell is Rupees 19.92 (this is
influenced significantly by a few large outliers), and for plots irrigated using
purchased water, it is Rupees 18.43. An analysis of variance of the MPWs (marginal
value products divided by Rs.102) shows that less than half the variation of the total
sum of squares (9.6 of 20.6) is attributable to within-group variation (i.e. variation of
MPWs across plots served by the same tubewell). In a setting of limited power
supply and unlined water channels, tubewells serve only plots located close to them.
As borne out also by the results of Simulation 1 below, it is remarkable how close the
MPWs of plots serviced by the same tubewell are, suggesting that the gains from
reallocating water locally would be relatively little.
V.2. Policy Simulations
Simulation 1. What would be profits and output from the sample plots if the
total observed water from each tubewell in the sample is allocated efficiently
across the plots that are serviced by that tubewell?
This exercise simulates an environment in which the observed water volume from
each tubewell is distributed to its recipient plots in order to maximize joint profits
(gross of other input costs). Since all the recipient plots face the same output price
and marginal cost of water extraction, and since there is water rationing (the water34
constraint binds), this exercise is the same as that of maximizing joint output. As
indicated in Table 5, redistributing water results in an average gain of less than 0.2
quintals per bigha, with the highest gain of 1 quintal per bigha (a gain of about 2%; in
value, Rs.102 per bigha) on plots which purchase water.
From the results of Simulation 1, we infer that the social contract appears to work
extremely well, to minimize losses in overall yields in the face of water rationing.
Simulation 1 also shows that at the observed levels of inputs and given the
estimated irrigation elasticity, incremental water alone has limited positive effect on
output.
Simulation 2. What would outputs be if the total observed water from each
tubewell is allocated to the plots it services so as to enable the tubewell owner
to maximize profits?
Table 6 displays the simulated plot outputs if water from each tubewell is allocated
according to Proposition 1; i.e., if a profit maximizing tubewell owner sells water only
after allocating enough to his own plots to equate the marginal value products on
them to the water price. The reallocation of water that this entails towards tubewell
owners’ plots increases outputs on those by 0.7 quintals per bigha, but average
yields on plots that buy water drop from 53.7 to 16.30 quintals per bigha! As a result,
overall yield declines from 57.51 to 48.14 quintals per bigha. The numbers can be
interpreted as follows. On average, tubewells that sell water service tubewell-owners’
and water buyers’ plots in the ratio 3:1 (in terms of area). A reallocation in
accordance with Proposition 1 adds some water to each plot of the tubewell owner;
due to the somewhat low irrigation elasticity, the positive effect on output is not too
pronounced. On the other hand, given that the area under water buyers’ plots is
much smaller, their overall water use in the sample is also relatively small. The
above reallocation therefore takes away a lot of this water, resulting in a sharp fall in
output.
Simulation 2 demonstrates the value of the social contract. It adds about 9 quintals
per bigha (19.5% larger than it would have been in the absence of a social contract),
worth more than Rupees 900 per bigha of output, on average on village plots. For a35
tubewell owner who irrigates 75% of his plots with his own tubewell, and a 25%
fragment elsewhere using bought water, this is also the value of the social contract:
what he loses due to it on own tubewell irrigated plots, he makes up on plots that buy
water, for an overall gain of 9 quintals per bigha.
Simulation 3. What would be the effect of unit pricing of power (at different
levels), and reliable power supply, on yields, profits, irrigation volumes and
power revenue?
Basic Assumptions: In the data set, tubewell pump set owners are charged Rupees
70 per horsepower per month. Most farmers report pumps to have 10 horsepower,
so annual charges are about Rupees 8700 (8400 + other minor charges). But in
actual fact, almost all pumps run on 20 horsepower
32. We base our simulations on
this fact. We assume for simplicity that the power provider does not charge any lump
sum fee, so only a price per kw hour of power set. Thus a unit power price of rupees
y per kw hour translates to approximately rupees 15y per hour, for a 20 horsepower
pump
33. Dividing this by the discharge from the tubewell, and adding to that the
estimated marginal cost of water extraction from this tubewell
34, we get a simulated
unit cost of extracting 1 bigha-inch of water. The simulated village-level water price
(per hour of use) is assumed to just cover the average cost of the highest cost
tubewell. This is consistent with 2 implications from the data set; first, the village
water price is roughly comparable to the mean average cost of water extraction per
hour plus the average fixed cost. Second, it is higher than the marginal cost of water
extraction of all tubewells, so that all tubewell owners will wish to sell surplus water.
From the simulated village per hour water price, we derive the implied water price
per bigha-inch, for each tubewell in the sample. Due to the village norm of setting
water price close to extraction cost, the water prices paid by water buyers are not too
                                                          
32 This is not surprising. Given the shortage of electricity to pump water, farmers compensate by
having more tubewells and horsepower than would otherwise be necessary, in order to pump up
water as quickly as possible.
33 Since 1 horsepower is approximately ¾ of a kilowatt. Unless the pump is simply idling, a running 20
HP pump consumes close to that, if the depth of the water table is sufficiently low.
34 The estimate of the Poisson parameter is 0.002 for non-submersibles and 0.0005 for the
submersibles. Correspondingly, on average the marginal costs of extraction for non-submersibles and
submersibles are, respectively, Rs. 1.45 and Rs. 0.3 per bigha-inch of water.36
much higher than the unit cost of extraction. This makes for a water allocation which
is reasonably close to an efficient one.
With the water prices and extraction costs in place, and other input and output prices
as given in the sample, we endow each plot with the estimated production
technology, and allow each plot in the sample to choose labor, tractor and oxen
hours, and irrigation volumes, in order to maximize profits as described by Eqs.(20)
and (21)
35. Note that we hold fixed the mapping of tubewell to user plot; this
determines specific water costs or prices for each plot.
The simulation. We vary the unit power price from Rs.1.80 (lower than estimates of
average power generation costs of Rs.2 in India; power transmission and distribution
costs are additional) to Rs.4.50 per kilowatt-hour (kWhr). The latter roughly
corresponds to commercial (industrial) rates in several parts of the country;
commercial rates also include a flat charge of about Rupees 50 per kWhr of load
sanctioned.
The results are summarized in Table 7 and Figures 1 and 2. Sample values for yield,
profit per bigha, irrigation volume per bigha and power revenue per bigha are
respectively 58.22 quintals, Rs.2490, 30 bigha-inches and Rs.270
36. These are
recorded in Table 7 as the “sample” scenario; for which the unit power price is zero
(and there is a lump sum monthly charge of Rs.70 per reported horsepower). At a
power price of Rs.4.50 per kw hour (close to rates charged to industry), irrigation
volume is 30.20 bigha-inches, yield is about 60.85 quintals, profits are above
Rs.2032, and revenue to the power provider is Rs.851. As the power price is lowered
gradually to Rs.1.80, irrigation volume increases to about 34.51 bigha-inches (thus
increasing on average 0.16 bigha-inch per 10 paise reduction in the power price),
yield increases slowly, to reach about 63.43 quintals, power revenue per bigha
decreases to Rs.384.62.
                                                          
35 Acreage and the variables with insignificant estimates (Table 3) are not optimized over.
36 Profit is calculated as revenue minus wage cost, rental costs of tractors and oxen, fertilizer cost and
water cost; and cost of power for tubewell owners. We do not subtract land rent. Incidentally, in this
area, there is very little land given out on rent. The wage cost includes an imputed wage for family
labor. Family labor can be quite important in several activities.37
Figure 1 provides a visual understanding of the relationship between irrigation
volume and yield. Note first that at 30.21 bigha inches, the yield of 60.8 quintals is
2.6 quintals above the sample yield of 58.2 quintals, for which irrigation is a
comparable 30.02 bigha-inches. From the knowledge of Simulation 1, we can
attribute less than 0.2 quintals of this increase to better water allocation than in the
sample. The rest of it is attributable to slightly higher input use in Simulation 3,
relative to the sample; with positive cross-partial derivatives in the production
function, this increases yield at the same level of water-use as in the sample
37.  Yield
increments thereafter are slow and diminish at higher irrigation levels.
Table 7 shows that for power prices up to Rs.2.50 per kWhr, farmers’ profits and the
power supplier’s revenues are both greater than their sample values; the significantly
higher simulated yields can therefore pay for electricity prices that cover the cost of
power generation. We noted earlier that in the present setup of lumpsum power
payments based on pump horsepower, there is widespread underreporting of
horsepower. Accurate assessments of pump horsepower would decrease sample
profits and increase sample power revenue by Rs.270 per bigha each. Under such
an alternative baseline scenario, Table 7 suggests that power prices between
Rs.2.70 and Rs.3.60 per kWhr are consistent with simulated profits and power
revenue being larger than their baseline values.
Simulation 3 therefore implies that even in the presence of a social contract that
results in a close-to efficient allocation of scarce water, a switch to remunerative
power pricing is feasible, acceptable to both farmers and power providers, and will
result in a substantial increase in yields.
However, water use is heavier than in the sample at power price levels that are
politically acceptable
38.
                                                          
37 The lower input use in the sample is due to the choices of risk-averse farmers to uncertainty in
water supply. As shown by Eq.10’ and 13’, at the input levels chosen by risk-averse farmers, the
marginal value product of an input exceeds the input price.
38 The simulated yields are considerably higher (exceeding the average sample yield by at least 25%
at the highest tariff level in the simulation) if they are evaluated after setting insignificant parameter
estimates of the production function to zero. So the results for simulated yields (and therefore for
profits) that we report ought to be viewed as a lower bound to the gains that are possible from a
switch to reliable, adequate electricity to power the tubewell pumps.38
Sustainability. What markup on the unit electricity price would make water use
intertemporally efficient?
Questions of sustainability of water use in the region are closely connected to
intertemporally efficient water extraction from an aquifer with recharge. The problem
of falling water tables, in this context, is one of overextraction of groundwater. An
individual farmer may not take into account the negative externality of his water use
on other farmers. In fact individual farmers are small enough that their individual
water extraction has a negligible impact on aquifer depletion, so in each season,
they may extract water until the single-period marginal revenue from it equals the
marginal extraction cost. This is clearly inoptimally large. We provide in this section
estimates of a markup on the unit social cost of power supply that can align an
individual farmer’s water extraction rate with what is socially optimal. An in-depth
study of intertemporal issues is beyond the scope of this paper, as this requires
knowledge of the groundwater hydrology of the region, data on water depletion over
time, and on characteristics and profitability of competing crops. So the estimates
here are indicative rather than definitive, and designed as a starting point for careful
future studies.
Suppose that aquifer recharge and the real price of sugarcane are constant, and the
sugarcane production function holds fixed levels of inputs other than irrigation at the
average sample values. We abstract also from possibilities of changes in technology,
number of tubewells, and availability of other crop cultivation opportunities.
Normalize by looking at a “representative” plot whose area A is the average sample
plot size (in bighas). Let  ) , ), (( ) ( β k j k x x f x F = be the production function of
sugarcane as a function of irrigation on the plot, where inputs  k j ≠ are fixed and
input k, irrigation water, is the only variable input. Let H be the depth (in inches) of
the underlying, flat-bottomed aquifer with vertical walls along the boundaries of the
representative plot (so that sugarcane is the only activity that affects groundwater
stock), d the depth (in inches) at which the water surface is at present, and S the39
groundwater stock (in bigha-inches). Therefore,
A d H S ) ( − =               (22)
Let  v R  be the constant, annual natural recharge (in bigha-inches) and R the
corresponding increment (in inches) of the water table. Let α  be the proportion of
irrigation water that recharges the aquifer. The average irrigation volumes in the
sample and Simulation 3 (30-34.5 bigha-inches per bigha), along with approximate
numbers  9 , 15 . 0 = = R α inches,
39 suggests that the water table will decrease at an
annual rate of 1 ½ or more feet.
However, individual farmers’ landholdings are very small relative to the size of the
sugarcane belt and the underlying aquifer; an individual farmer’s water use has
negligible effect on groundwater stock, so that the farmer is expected, in period t, to
maximize period t profit:
kt t kt t x y S c x pF ) , ( ) ( − = π                         (23)
where p is sugarcane price, and  ) , ( y S c t  is the cost of extracting 1 bigha-inch of
water as a function of the groundwater stock  t S , with unit electricity price y as a
parameter. However a social planner would take into account the increase in
pumping cost as the water table falls due to water extraction in period t. The unit
social cost of extracting 1 bigha-inch at period t equals
1 | ) , ( ' | ) 1 ( ) , ( + − + kt t t x y S c y S c α δ           (24)
the second term being the negative effect on pumping cost in period t+1 (δ is the
time-discount factor, and  ' c  is the derivative of the unit cost of extraction with respect
to groundwater stock). The question we ask is: Suppose y is the economic cost of
generating, transmitting and providing 1 kwhr of electricity. What is the unit electricity
                                                          
39 See for example, R.S. Chaturvedi (1997).40
price  y ~, marked up on y, such that an individual farmer’s unit cost  ) ~ , ( y S c t at this
price equals the Eq.(24) unit social cost of water extraction?
Ignoring pumping cost arising out of repair costs, the unit electricity price affects the
pumping cost as follows. To extract 1 bigha-inch (or 20,558 kg) of water at a water
depth of  m d metres requires work of approximately  m d 205580 joules. An ideal 1 kw
(kilowatt) machine would perform this task in ( 000 , 600 , 3 / 580 , 205 m d ) hours. A 1 kw
pump with efficiency E (between 0.55 to 0.75 for electrical motors) would require
) 000 , 600 , 3 / 580 , 205 ( z dm hours, where z=(1/E). So if y is the price of 1 kwhr (kilowatt-
hour) of electricity, using Eq.(22) and  ) 37 . 39 / (d dm = , we have
  )) / ( ( ) , ( A S H zy c y S c − = ,  A zy c y S c / ) ( ) , ( ' − =           (25)
where  ) 37 . 39 000 , 600 , 3 /( 580 , 205 × = c . Using Eqs.(22), (24) and (25), we get
}] / ) ) 1 ( {( 1 [ ~
1 t kt Ad x y y + − + = α δ           (26)
where  t d is the water table depth (in inches) in period t. The economic cost of
generating and transmitting 1 unit of electricity is arguably between Rupees 2.50 and
3 at present. At corresponding levels of extraction (available from Simulation 3),
current water table depth of about 960 inches (80 feet), and a discount factor of 0.95,
we get  y y 027 . 1 ~ = . For instance, for an economic unit cost of power of Rupees 3, the
markup is about Rupees 0.08.
The low, 2.7% markup in fact understates the effect of the negative externality from
pumping. The simplest way to see this is to set up a social planner’s problem of
maximizing the discounted present value of profits from sugarcane, taking into






) ) , ( ) ( (
t
kt t kt
t x y S c x pF δ  subject to an initial groundwater stock41
0 S , and its evolution  kt v t t x R S S ) 1 ( 1 α − − + = + . Let  ) ( t S V be the maximum value of
discounted future profits evaluated in period t. Then the social planner will solve
)] ( ) , ( ) ( [ ) ( 1 + + − = t kt t kt x t S V x y S c x pF Max S V
kt δ           (27)
subject to  kt v t t x R S S ) 1 ( 1 α − − + = + , where δ  is the discount factor. Solving this, we
get that along the optimal path,
] ) , ( ' ) 1 ( ) , ( ) ( ' [ ) , ( ) ( ' 1 1 1 1 + + + + − − − + = kt t t kt t kt x y S c y S c x pF y S c x pF α δ           (28)
Comparing Eq.(24) with the right hand of Eq.(28), we see that the latter has an
additional term,  )) , ( ) ( ' ( 1 1 y S c x pF t kt + + − δ  , corresponding to foregone future profits as
a consequence of incremental water extraction today. While this term evaluates to
zero for a farmer who undertakes period-by-period profit maximization, it is positive
along the socially optimal path. We are interested in whether this results in  y ~being a
substantially higher markup on y than the 2.7% obtained on evaluating Eq.(26).
The markup depends on where the sugarcane economy is on the optimal path.
Since the model is too simplistic, we do not undertake the full-blown exercise of
solving for the optimal path. Since the optimal path in this model converges to an
equilibrium or steady state  ) , ( k x S in which rates of water extraction and recharge
(natural and backflow from irrigation) are equal; (i.e., where water extraction is
sustainable), we calculate the markup in the steady state. Substituting steady state
values for groundwater stock and water extraction in Eq.(28) and rearranging using
Eqs.(22) and (25), we get
] } )) 1 ( /( ) ) 1 ( ( { 1 [ ~ δ α δ − − + = d A x y y k           (29)
where  d is the steady state depth of the water table. A principal shortcoming of this
simple model is that the steady-state rate of water extraction corresponds to about
11 bigha-inches per bigha, which is less than half of what is agronomically sensible
for sugarcane. A better model would therefore incorporate the possibility of crop42
switching. Since such a switch would necessarily be to a less irrigation intensive
activity, the steady state groundwater stock for the present model is an upper bound
for what would be optimal in a more sophisticated model.
We find that the minimum, steady state water table depth (under conservative
assumptions about aquifer depth, pump efficiency etc.) is about 107 feet. Evaluating
Eq.(29) under this assumption, we get  y y 148 . 1 ~ = . Thus the required markup of
14.8% is substantially larger than that suggested by evaluating Eq.(26); if y=Rupees
3, the markup is Rupees 0.44.
We conclude that power supply reform should incorporate a markup of about 15% on
the economic cost of providing electricity. Finally, note that a steady state water table
depth of 107 feet suggests that the “surplus” 27 feet be mined sensibly while
converging to a sustainable policy.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The principal crops of North India include two water intensive crops – sugarcane and
paddy. This paper attempts to understand the institutions that govern the water
economy in sugarcane production in this region. In the context of low and decreasing
water tables, policy should focus on two objectives: first, the water used in
agriculture should maximize yields; for this it is necessary that water be allocated
efficiently across the sugarcane producing region. Second, that water usage should
be at levels that are sustainable.
Our sample shows that irrigation volumes show considerable variation across plots.
By estimating a production function, we discover that the marginal product of water is
significantly higher than the water prices on the plots, evidence of widespread water
rationing. The MPWs are also significantly different across plots. But Simulation 1
confirms that the negative effect on yield from this is very small; the close-to-efficient
water allocation is in sharp contrast to much of the literature which most often finds
in favor of inefficiency. We infer the existence of village level social norms of water
sharing that result in efficient water allocation. Simulation 2 shows that water43
allocation in the absence of such a social contract would result in an 18% decrease
in average yield. While the social contract successfully avoids water misallocation
arising from water rationing, the rationing has other negative effects: limited power
availability leads to overinvestment is tubewells and pump horsepower to enable
pumping up water as quickly as possible.
In addition to restricting water supply below demand, the erratic nature of the power
supply introduces considerable uncertainty in the water availability and irrigation
timing.  This paper does not address the effect of erratic timing of irrigations on
yields. Even so, Simulation 3 shows that in a setting of reliable power supply, yields
increase by 4% at irrigation levels comparable to those in the sample, and by up to
9% if the entire water demand can be met with the help of adequate power supply.
Yield increases come at the cost of heavier water use, even at fairly high electricity
prices. The higher yields are sufficient to pay for the power tariffs necessary to
incentivize the power provider to supply reliable and adequate power.
While a rationalized power policy can be of great help in maximizing “crop per drop”,
it cannot by itself address the problem of sustainability, at least at reasonable power
prices
40. At such prices, irrigation volumes are between 8.5 and 12.5 percent higher
than in the sample. This is not hard to understand, given that water consumption
itself is not priced. We must also bear in mind the way in which agricultural belts
develop in sugarcane, paddy and other crops. This reflects great economies of
agglomeration, and well-oiled supply chains from farmer to factory to retail markets.
So for a water intensive crop, a relentless thirst for water is not unexpected. In the
backdrop of rapid growth, traditional rights of water use may prove inadequate to the
task of governing water use in a sustainable fashion, as individual farmers ignore the
negative externality of their water extraction on others. None of the standard
suggestions such as pricing of water, Pigovian taxes etc. have been implemented
anywhere; more research is required to understand what institutions will be attentive
to the shadow price of water use
41. We suggest that a markup of about 15% on the
                                                          
40 Prices somewhere between Rupees 2 and Rupees 3 per kw-hour should cover the economic cost
of providing power. While Simulation 3 shows that sugarcane cultivation is quite profitable even at
substantially higher rates in the study area, this may not be true for all parts of the sugarcane belt.
41 See Shah, Zilberman and Chakravorty (1993) for a discussion of first and second-best solutions to
the externality problem related to groundwater use.44
economic cost of providing electricity may result in farmers’ water extraction activity
to be in line with what is socially optimal. The resulting decrease in farmers’ incomes
can in principle be compensated through lump sum transfers.
Implementability is a serious concern for changing the power regime.  The financial
condition and rules of operation of traditional power providers (SEBs) are such that
these providers lack credibility. If they were to announce a radically different power
pricing scheme in return for reliable power supply, announcements on reliability
would, likewise, probably lack credibility. For one thing, North India faces power
shortage at present. The electricity charges for industry and for households are far
higher than estimates of the economic cost of producing and delivering power
efficiently. It is debatable whether the power provider will sell adequate and reliable
electricity to farmers at unit prices below what it can charge power-constrained
industries and households. Deeper structural changes, such as allowing competition
between multiple power providers may work but this requires a huge regime change.
Nevertheless, our paper demonstrates that the “fundamentals” of the sugarcane belt,
on questions of yields, yield responses to water allocation, and profitability are at
levels that can respond favorably to such regime changes.
The present paper represents only a first step at addressing the objectives herein, as
its focus is on a single village. A larger study would be better able to control
confounding factors, and result in better estimates of a sugarcane production
function and simulations that are more finely varied. Nevertheless, the narrow focus
on a single village brings out elements and institutions common to the sugarcane
belt as a whole; these insights can be used in a larger study.45
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APPENDIX A:  LIST OF VARIABLES COLLECTED
A.1.  Plot-Specific
A.1.1. Irrigation:
Date of Irrigation ‘i’, where i=1,2,…
Desired date of for providing i
th irrigation
Reason for being unable to irrigate on desired date
Source of irrigation (own tubewell, shared tubewell or purchased water)
Whether the field was flooded on  i
th irrigation (yes or no)
The depth of water in inches on the i
th  irrigation
Number of hours on i
th  irrigation taken to flood the field to reported number of inches
Terms of irrigation when source is a shared tubewell
Terms of purchase where source is purchased water






Iron (parts per million)
Copper (parts per million)
Zinc (parts per million)
Potassium (parts per million)
A.1.3. Seed, Fertilizer, Manure, Insecticides and Pesticides
Seed (for fresh-sown) quantity
Number of applications of fertilizer
Amount applied (by type of fertilizer—urea, DAP, superphosphate etc) on 1
st
application
Cost of input on 1
st application49
Amount applied (by type of fertilizer—urea, DAP, superphosphate etc) on 2
st
application
Cost of input on 2
nd application etc.
Similarly,
Number of applications of pesticide/weedicide etc
Amount applied (by type of pesticide/weedicide etc) on each application
Cost of input at each application
A.1.4. Labor
By activity: (which include sowing, weeding, digging, irrigating, fertilizer application,
providing support to sugarcane stalks, harvesting)
Number of persons engaged
broken down by: hired (casual), hired (permanent), family, exchange labor,
piece rate
Number of hours of labor
broken down by: hired (casual), hired (permanent), family, exchange labor,
piece rate
Payment for hired labor
broken down by cash and kind components
A.1.5. Tractor and oxen hours:
By activity:
Number of hours of tractor used on plot
broken down by own, hired, exchange, piece-rate
Payment for hired tractor use
broken down by cash and kind components
Number of oxen hours used on plot broken down by own, hired, exchange, piece-
rate
A.1.6. Area
Area under sugarcane by variety and type
Terms of lease (farmer-cultivated, leased-in, leased-out)
Area under other crops50
A.1.7. Output:
By variety and plot (rattoon versus fresh sown, early variety and general variety)
Date of harvest
Quantity harvested
Quantity sold to mill
Quantity sold to other private purchasers
Price obtained from private buyer
A.2. Tubewell-Specific
Type of tubewell installed (submersible versus nonsubmersible)
Name of owners (both own and joint)
Year of installation
Depth of boring, filter and pump
Depth of water level
Horsepower of pump
Cost of installation
Number of times in previous year repairs were effected
Major reasons repair was necessitated
Amount spent on repair each time
Amount spent on electricity over 12 months
Tubewell history (particulars of why deepening, tubewell/pump replacement was
necessitated)
Discharge (amount taken to fill 150-litre tanks, average of two measurement)
A.3. Farm household-specific
Demographic composition of farm household
Education level of adult members of the household
Farm assets
Other assets51
APPENDIX B. TECHNICAL DETAILS
B.1. Proofs of Propositions
Proof (sketch) of Proposition 1.
Farmer  i’s water demand comes out of the optimization problem: Choose
nonnegative  ik x  to
Maximize  ) ) , ), (( ( ik ik ik ij x q x x pf u − β . Since  0 '> u , we may apply  1 − u to the
maximand. The first-order condition for an interior max is solved by the amount  *
ik x ,
defined in Eq.(2) of the text.
So, once the choices of inputs other than water,  ) ( ), ( ij sj x x have been made, and a
water volume  t w is realized, the optimization problem for farmer s is:
Choose nonnegative amounts  ik sk x x , to maximize
) ) ( ) , ), (( ( ik t ik sk t sk sj x c q x c x x pf u − + − β , subject to  t ik sk w x x ≤ + and  *
ik ik x x ≤ .
Applying  1 − u to the maximand, form the Lagrangean function  L =
), ( ) ( ) ( ) , ), ((
*
ik sk t ik ik ik i sk s ik sk t ik ik sk sj x x w x x x x x x c x q x x pf − − + − + + + + − + µ λ λ λ β
we get the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for an optimum:
0 ) , ), (( = − + − µ λ β s t sk sj k c x x pf (B.1.1)
0 = − − + − λ µ λ i t ik c q (B.1.2)
0 = sk sx λ (B.1.3)
0 = ik ix λ (B.1.4)52
0 ) ( * = − ik ik x x λ (B.1.5)
0 ) ( = − − ik sk t x x w µ (B.1.6)
(B.1.3) to (B.1.6) hold with complementary slackness. Suppose  0 = ik x , so
0 , 0 ≥ = i λ λ . Substituting (B.1.2) in (B.1.1) we get  ik i sk sj k q x x pf = − λ β ) , ), (( . So,
the solution to this,  sk x , is less than or equal to  *
sk x (as defined in Eq.(1) of the text).
Moreover, it must be that  sk t x w = , for if instead we have  sk t x w > , then by (B.1.6),
0 = µ . Plugging this in (B.1.2), that equation becomes  0 = + − i t ik c q λ . But since
0 , 0 ≥ > − i t ik c q λ , we have a contradiction. Thus we have that  *
sk t x w ≤ implies that
the water allocation is  ) 0 , ( ) , ( t ik sk w x x = . The rest of the specification in Proposition
1 is proved with similar arguments. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Consider the function  ] , 0 [ ] , 0 [ ] , 0 [ ] , 0 [ : t t t t w w w w F × → × defined by:
))) )( (( )), )( (( ( ) , ( * *
sk ij ik ik sj sk ik sk x x x x x x x x F = . That is, suppose the social contract
described under Assumption 1A (Section IV) governs water allocation using the
parameters  ik sk x x , .  ) )( ( ik sj x x is the vector of inputs j,  k j ≠ , that solves Eq.(10)
when i’s water parameter is  ik x .  )) )( (( *
ik sj sk x x x  is the irrigation volume that solves
Eq.(1) if the vector of other inputs equals  ) ( sj x . The function  ) )( ( ik sj x x  is continuous
by the Theorem of the Maximum. The function  ) ( *
sj sk x x  is continuous by an
application of the Implicit Function Theorem on Eq.(1). So, their composition,
)) )( (( *
ik sj sk x x x , is continuous. The second component of F,  )) )( (( *
sk ij ik x x x  is
similarly defined, for farmer i, using Eq.(13) in place of Eq.(10) and Eq.(2) in place of
Eq.(1). This component is continuous by the same argument as for the first
component. Therefore, F is a continuous function on a compact set. By Brouwer’s53
Fixed Point Theorem, there exists a fixed point  ) , ( * *
ik sk x x . Using this  *
sk x and  *
ik x  to
define the water sharing in the social contract, solutions  ) ( sj x to Eq.(10) and  ) ( ij x to
Eq.(13) will also solve Eq.(10) and Eq.(13) simultaneously. These solutions, along
with water allocations  ik sk X X , defined using  *
sk x and  *
ik x , therefore constitute an
equilibrium.
B.2.  Confidence Intervals for Marginal Product of Water
Let the estimated marginal product of water on plot i be  ) ˆ , ( β i k x f  (see Section IV).
Since  β ˆ  is consistent, for a large enough sample we can take a first-order Taylor
approximation of the marginal product:
) ˆ ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ˆ , ( β β β β β β − ≈ −
T
i k i k i k x f D x f x f (B.2.1)
where 
T
i k x f D ) , ( β β  is the transpose of the gradient of the function  k f (with respect
to the parameter vector β ), evaluated at  ) , ( β i x . Let  n Cov V / ) ˆ (β = , or a
consistent estimator of it. If β ˆ  is asymptotically normal, we have
) , 0 ( ) ˆ ( V N n
d →  − β β (B.2.2)
From Eq.(C.1) and (C.2) we get




i k i k x f D V x f D N x f x f n →  − (B.2.3)
Or, in simpler notation,
) , 0 ( ) ˆ (
2
i i i w
d
w w N m m n σ →  − (B.2.4)54
Replace  β  with β ˆ  on the RHS in Eq.(B.2.3), and call the resulting variance 
2 ˆ
i w σ .
Using this and Eq.(B.2.4), we have













From this we get the 95% confidence interval
95 . 0 ))
ˆ 96 . 1
ˆ ,
ˆ 96 . 1















B.3. Estimating Marginal Cost of Water Extraction from a Tubewell
Farmers pay a lump sum annual electricity charge for running a tubewell. So the
marginal cost of water extraction includes only those maintenance costs that depend
on water output. Maintenance costs are essentially costs of repairing the pump set in
the event of a breakdown. While the frequency of breakdowns is high due to power
surges, what is germane here is that the number of breakdowns may depend on the
number of hours that the tubewell operates. It also depends on whether the machine
is a submersible (fewer breakdowns) or a nonsubmersible. We assume that the
number of breakdowns follows a Poisson Process (see Ross (1997)) with
parameters  2 1,µ µ  for submersibles and non-submersibles respectively. Let
2 1,J J be the sets of submersibles and nonsubmersibles respectively. So, for
submersible tubewell j, the probability that the number of breakdowns N equals  j n  if
it runs for time  j h ,
!
) (







e n N h N
j
j µ µ − = = − (B.3.1)55
Using Eq.(B.3.1) and data on total number of breakdowns and number of running
hours for each submersible tubewell, we set up a likelihood function and get an
estimate  1 ˆ µ for the Poisson parameter.
Since the likelihood of the submersible sample 





















































which is just the total (or average) number of submersible breakdowns in the data
divided by the total (or average) number of hours that submersibles in the data ran
for. A similar exercise yields the Poisson parameter estimate for nonsubmersibles.
Suppose that it takes time  j t to extract 1 unit (bigha-inch) of water using submersible
tubewell j.
Then, the expected number of breakdowns in this time,
j j t t N E 1 ˆ )) ( ( µ = (B.3.4)
Our estimated marginal cost of water extraction from this tubewell is the above
number times the average cost of repair.56
B.4. Aggregating General and Early Variety Yields
Plots in the data set are either all covered with a rattoon crop, or fresh sown
sugarcane. Rattoon crops can differ by year of rattoon with the oldest crop being
three years. In the surveyed village, two varieties of sugarcane are grown. These are
early and general variety and they differ slightly by sugar content and therefore by
price. The early variety with a higher sugar content commands a 5% higher price
than the general variety. Some plots have sown on them two varieties of sugarcane
while others have only one variety. Out of a total of 326 plots, 33 plots grow early
variety and 203 plots grow general variety of sugarcane. On the remaining 91 plots,
both varieties are grown.
For plots with one variety of sugarcane the average yield was calculated by using the
plot area. For plots with both varieties or mixed plots, area allotted to each type had
to be constructed. A ratio “a” of the average yields across the early and general
variety was computed .
For a “mixed plot” t, let  t t t t X A G E , , ,  be respectively, output of early and general
varieties, total plot area, and area under early variety. This last variable was
unobserved. We assumed that the early and general yields were in the proportion a
computed above. Using this ratio, we applied the following :
)) /( ( ) / ( t t t t t X A G a X E − = , from which we obtained
) /( t t t t t E aG E A X + = . Having calculated  t X , we then computed the two yields from
this plot as,  )) /( ( ), / ( t t t t t X A G X E − .
Yields for each plot were then calculated using an average across the two varieties
for mixed plots, while for mono variety plots, the average computed before was
considered.57
TABLES
Table 1.  Summary statistics on water use and yields





Average number of plots irrigated 4.0 6.8
Average number of plots to which water is sold 1.7 0.8
% of tubewells reporting no water sales 42 67





Average electricity costs (Rs.) per year 9665 9012
Average number of times repairs were effected 1.5 3.2
Average maintenance costs (Rs.)  per year 3356 6151
Average time taken to irrigate one bigha 90 120










Number of plots 117 123 87
Average area per plot (bighas) 11.7 5.7 4.7
Mean number of irrigations 10.7 9.6 8.0
% plots receiving 5 irrigations before
31 July (start of monsoon)
73 61 3758







Overall 60.4 59.8 53.4
Rattoon yields 68 69 60
Fresh-sown  yields 48 47 45
1.5.  Yields, by soil type and source of irrigation (quintals per bigha)
Sandy loam soils Loam soils
Category I 57 57
Category II 60 57
Category III 52 58





Output (quintals) 443.22 430.1632 30 4000
Plot Area
(bighas)
7.49 6.207829 1 50
Labor (hours) 1302.23 1189.119 178 9190
Manure
(quintals)
116.19 228.4198 Neg 2520
Fertilizers (value) 1704.15 1686.361 81 10915
Tractor(hours) 7.91 22.15217 Neg 200
Oxen(hours) 86.37 99.61757 Neg 568
Irrigation (bigha-
inches)
222.52 208.5923 5.2 133059
Table 3. Cobb-Douglas Production Function Estimates (Variables in logs)
Output Coefficient Standard Error t-ratio
Plot Area 0.7422*** 0.0444 16.71
Labor 0.0762*** 0.0287 2.65
Manure          0.0014 0.0060 0.23
Fertilizers        - 0.0280 0.0177 -1.58
Tractor 0.0905*** 0.0176 5.14
Oxen 0.1254*** 0.0177 7.07




Farmer Dummies ** and ***
Constant 2.9962*** 0.1749 17.13
Other information on the Cobb-Douglas Estimation:
Number of Observations: 326; F(16,309) = 396.47; Prob > F = 0.0000; R-squared=0.9536;
Adjusted R-squared=0.9511
Table 4A. Estimates for Value of Marginal Product of Water (MPW) (incremental
rupees  per incremental bigha-inch), with 95% Confidence Intervals; Water Price
(rupees per bigha-inch)






MPW All 326 16.63* 25.753 4.455 91.902
Upper
Conf
All 326 16.67 25.800 4.466 92.086
Lower
Conf
All 326 16.60 25.705 4.444 91.729
Water
Price
All 326 6.53 2.12 2.77 13.64
*We dropped two outliers which reduced the mean value of marginal product of
water to Rs.14.9 per bigha-inch increase in irrigation volume. There was a
substantial decline in standard deviation to 9.26, thus re-enforcing the fact that the
marginal products were fairly closely distributed.60
Table 4B. Mean Marginal Value Product of Water by Plot Type`
Variable Plot Type # of plots Mean
MPW Own TW 117 11.872
Uppr Conf Own TW 117 11.899
Lowr Conf Own TW 117 11.844
MPW Joint TW 122 19.916
Uppr Conf Joint TW 122 19.960
Lowr Conf Joint TW 122 19.873
MPW Bought 86 18.434
Uppr Conf Bought 86 18.476
Lowr Conf Bought 86 18.392
Table 5. Simulation 1: What would be profits and output from the sample plots
if the total observed water from each tubewell in the sample is allocation
efficiently across the plots that are serviced by that tubewell?















Plots that bought water 53.58 +1.0 +102.0
Yield = quintals of sugarcane per bigha; Value = rupees per bigha; Sample Area=2350 bighas61
Table 6. Simulation 2: What would outputs be if the total observed water from
each tubewell is allocated to the plots it services so as to enable the tubewell
owner to maximize profits?















Table 7. Simulation 3: Effect of Unit Power Price on Yields, Irrigation Volumes,
Profits







1.8 63.4338 2636.1804 34.5176 384.6204
1.9 63.3836 2616.2357 34.1385 401.7316
2 63.3360 2596.4366 33.7963 418.8289
2.1 63.2907 2576.7693 33.4861 435.9144
2.2 63.2476 2557.2219 33.2035 452.9903
2.3 63.1195 2533.6659 32.9956 471.0904
2.4 63.0813 2514.2502 32.7635 488.3062
2.5 62.9887 2491.9996 32.6012 506.6464
2.6 62.9545 2472.6854 32.4072 523.9775
2.7 62.9216 2453.4454 32.2274 541.3042
2.8 62.8899 2434.2745 32.0603 558.6274
2.9 62.8594 2415.1678 31.9047 575.9475
3 62.8299 2396.1209 31.7593 593.2650
3.1 62.8014 2377.1302 31.6232 610.5804
3.2 62.7738 2358.1919 31.4957 627.8941
3.3 62.4314 2322.9822 31.1251 642.1855
3.4 62.4080 2304.1724 31.0277 659.6200
3.5 62.3852 2285.4019 30.9359 677.0532
3.6 61.6417 2231.5214 30.5945 690.0775
3.7 61.6243 2212.8377 30.5327 707.7468
3.8 60.9425 2162.8572 30.4896 725.9292
3.9 60.9292 2144.1180 30.4425 743.9014
4 60.9163 2125.3980 30.3977 761.8723
4.1 60.9036 2106.6964 30.3551 779.8420
4.2 60.8913 2088.0123 30.3145 797.8106
4.3 60.8793 2069.3449 30.2757 815.7783
4.4 60.8676 2050.6933 30.2386 833.7451
4.5 60.8562 2032.0570 30.2032 851.7112
Units: Power Price: Rupees per kilowatt hour; Yield: Quintals per bigha; Profits: Rupees per bigha
Irrigation Volume: Bigha Inches (per bigha); Power Revenue: Rupees per bigha
                                                                                                                                                                                    
∗ This simulation was conducted over 163 plots to account for only those tubewells which served63
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buyers’ plots.